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Some Kinds of Ironic Blame-by-Praise:
An Attempt to Classify
by WILLIAM FREEDMAN

"BYKnox,the"was,
most frequently used meaning of irony," writes Norman
during the English classical period as during the
FAR

preceding eighteen or nineteen centuries, 'censure through counterfeited
praise.' "1 Two out of every three appearances of irony in Knox's abundant sampling utilized this meaning, and "So dominant was this sense that
people sometimes assumed that if a device was referred to as irony it must
necessarily be blame-by-praise, although it might in actuality be
something else . . . . To blame-by-praise . . . was the central and dominant meaning of irony."2
For all its importance, however, for all its dominance of the ironic
field, both in the English classical age and before it, irony as blame-bypraise has yet to be adequately classified and analyzed. Knox himself
devotes a nlajor chapter of his book to "The Methods of Blame-By-Praise
Associated with IronY,"3 and distinguishes eight such methods. Since
Knox is interested in techniques rather than kinds, seven of the methods
are merely means of achieving indirectly what one of them, "Direct
praise," accomplishes directly: ironic praise for virtuous qualities the
target does not possess or for what are in fact blame-worthy qualities or
vices. Only these two are isolated as what we might call types or classes
of ironic blame-by-praise. D. C. Muecke, who also deals with problems
of ironic classification, focuses more directly on the question of kinds and
offers three. The first two - "Praise for desirable qualities known to be
lacking" and "Praise for having undesirable qualities or for lacking
desirable qualities" - are those Knox observes in his discussion of
nlethods. The third, an important addition to the roster, is what Muecke
calls "Inappropriate or irrelevant praise: as when vital principles being at
stake, one praises an ecclesiastical measure for being convenient or
economical or politically shrewd."4
The literature on irony is voluminous and growing. Yet this is the best
we have by way of classification of the form of irony that controlled the
1. Norman Knox, The Word Irony and its Context, 1500-1755 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke Univ.
Press, 1961), p. 12.
2. Knox, The Word Irony, pp. 12-13.
3. Knox, The Word Irony, Ch. III, pp. 99-140: Socratic self-depreciation, Direct praise, Simple concession, Ironic advice, Ironic defense, The fallacious argument, Burlesque, and The fictitious character.
4. D. C. Muecke, The Compass of Irony (London: Methuen, 1969), p. 67.
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field until at least the middle of the eighteenth century. The subject, I
believe, is much more complex, the field more thickly planted (or mined)
than we have noticed. Knox is surely correct when he remarks that much
of the eighteenth-century satiric literature was blame-by-praise irony
"employing very complicated techniques."5 But because I do not think we
have yet begun to recognize the extent or complexity of either the techniques or the kinds of blame-by-praise irony present in that literature, I
find Knox somewhat sanguine when he remarks in a later review that
"When Swift says pleasant things of an enemy, we know how to class his
irony . . . . "6 We may know how to class it, but, at the very least, we do
not yet know how to subclassify it. We may have identified it as blame-bypraise irony, but we have not determined which of the many categories of
such irony it belongs to; nor have we situated it on a spectrum of satiric
severity, interpreted its implications for speaker and audience, or said
much more about it than even a Partridge, a Shadwell, or a Cibber might
have discerned and determined for himself.
Blame-by-praise irony is indigenous to satire everywhere and in all
literary periods. But for the sake of convenience and compactness I will
limit my illustrations to the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century satire
in which it flourished. No theoretical problems, I believe, are involved
in extrapolating beyond these chronological boundaries. In my search
through this literature I have distinguished eight kinds or categories of
blame-by-praise irony. Included anlong them are the three mentioned by
Knox and Muecke, but I will discuss these as well, since I want to try to
do nlore than merely identify them as strategies. The possibilities for
classification and arrangenlent are many, and almost any grid imposed on
the available data will smack of a certain arbitrariness. Still, a lack of inevitability is not synonymous with pointlessness, and I believe there is
value in the classification system I propose.
I will try to place these eight strategies on a ladder of severity, beginning
with the mildest form of ironic blame-by-praise and ending with the one
that suggests the greatest degree of decadence, vice, or corruption in the
target and in the society which breeds and nurtures him. The measurement of severity thus includes two basic components: the relationship or
distance between the satirist and the subject of praise; and the implications of the utterance for the general state of the society's values and (in
some instances) of the language it employs to articulate them. The mildest
form of blame-by-praise will therefore be one that suggests a relatively
mild criticism of the satiric target and which implies that the satirist shares
a relatively healthy set of values with his audience and society. The harshest will be one in which the satirist and the person or world he speaks both
to and of are divided by a vast moral gulf and which suggests that the
5. Knox, The Word Irony, p. 16.
6. Norman Knox, "On the Classification of Ironies," Modern Philology, LXX (1972), 53.
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moral system (and perhaps the language itself) is in a grievous state of
decay.
1. Quasi-ironic praise ofgenuine virtues. When Pope, in "The Rape of
the Lock," repeatedly associates Belinda with the sun, identifying her, for
example, as "the rival of his beams" (II, 3); when he praises her "awful
Beauty that puts on all its arms" (I, 139); when he likens her to a "Goddess" (I, 132) who "smiled and all the world was gay" (II, 52) or who said
"Let Spades be trumps! ... and trumps they were" (III, 46), he is speaking with almost equal parts of candor and criticism. Belinda's beauty is
both real and awesome, the almost godlike power that flows from it
equally genuine and enviable. Belinda is praised not for virtues she does
not have, not for vices that parade as virtues, not for trivial or peripheral
qualities, but for qualities she unmistakably has, and in imposing
measure. The praise is for real and substantial virtues, then, and it is in
significant part sincere. But it is a kind of blame-by-praise because it is
also partially ironic. Belinda is praised for her beauty and her power, but
she is teased or scolded for flaunting them excessively, for focusing on
them too narrowly, and for subordinating to them too much that should
matter more. Mock heroic deflation and affectionate admiration join in
the image of Belinda as sun or goddess.
Pope's portrait of Atticus (Addison) in his "Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot"
is a comparable example. Addison is praised as
. . . One whose fires
True Genius kindles, and fair Fame inspires;
Blest with each talent and each art to please,
And born to write, converse, and live with ease . . . . (193-96)

This catalogue of genuine virtues is overbalanced by a spread of faults
and weaknesses which Pope enumerates at greater length. When he concludes his portrait with the questions,
Who but must laugh, if such a man there be?
Who would not weep, if Atticus were he? (213-14)

he incorporates the praise into the broader yet qualified blame. Atticus's
vices are more regrettable still for the virtues they accompany, for belonging to a man of genuine parts. The praise is thus seriously intended but,
as in the portrai~ of Belinda, it contributes to a larger satiric point and
purpose. The praise of Belinda is itself only partially sincere, partially
ironically exaggerated. The praise of Atticus is entirely sincere but given
ironic import by juxtaposition with failings that are more lamentable for
their attachment to such strengths. The point in both instances is to express pity for the failure of the satiric targets fully to measure up to the
praise extended to them.
The virtues are real, the praise only partially ironic. The poet in both
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examples speaks directly and in his own person. 7 He is above his target
but not entirely out of sympathy with him/her. Moreover, he assumes a
shared set of values with his audience and, to a certain degree, even with
Belinda's society. He expects them to recognize, if only they are pointed
out, virtues as virtues, excesses as excesses, and vices as vices; all are
agreed on the definitions of each and capable of recognizing them in action. Clearly, this is a mild form of blame-by-praise, one more appropriate to reformative than to punitive satire. It expresses a measure of
fondness for its victim and, by the qualification of the attack, encourages
the target to lower its defense and accept the curative blows that mingle
with the affectionate strokes.

2. Praise for desirable qualities the target does not possess. This is the
second of our categories, but the first of the three commonly recognized
as a form of blanle-by-praise. Examples are plentiful. In Book Two of
Gulliver's Travels, Gulliver, in his conversation with the King of Brobdingnag, praises the British government, parliament, and economy for a
variety of virtues we are evidently to understand they do not have.
Gulliver describes, for instance, "that extraordinary care always taken of
[the Peers'] . . . Education in Arts and Arms, to qualify them for being
Counsellors born to the King and Kingdonl . . . and to be Champions
always ready for the Defence of their Prince and Country by their Valour,
Conduct and Fidelity" (II, Chap. 6). Symmetrically, he praises the
members of the House of Commons as "all principal Gentlemen, freely
picked and culled out by the People themselves, for their great Abilities,
and Love of their Country, to represent the Wisdom of the whole Nation." He describes England's Judges as "venerable Sages and Interpreters
of the Law," lauds the "prudent Managenlent of our Treasury; the Valour
and Atchievements of our Forces by Sea and Land" (II, 6), and so forth.
Gulliver, of course, is serious in his praise of the English system at this
early stage in his education. So, too, if we accept the "author" of the
"Argument Against Abolishing Christianity" as a persona, is the Nominal
Christian when he speaks of the "wonderful Productions of Wit" and of
the "Genius" of the "Free-Thinkers, the Strong Reasoners, and the Men
of Profound Learning" who thrive on raillery and invectives against
religion. And so, of course, is Dr. Pangloss when he speaks of Leibniz's
pre-established harmony, plenum, and materia subtilis as "the most
beautiful thing[s] in the world." The Baron in Pope's "Rape of the Lock,"
on the other hand, speaks with unmistakable sarcasm when he laments the
futility of the eloquence of the blustering Sir Plume, "Who speaks so
well . . ." (IV, 132); as does Swift in the ironic title of his poem, "On a
Beautiful Young Nymph Going to Bed."
7. Or, following Maynard Mack, in one of his characteristic guises or personalities. Distinctions of this
kind become critical for us only when - as is not the case here - the persona becomes an object of satiric
attack.
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In this form of blame-by-praise, the praise is no longer merely partially
or contributively ironic, but completely so. And the praise is no longer for
virtues in large measure present, but for those conspicuous and strident
in their absence. The gap, therefore, between the satirist and his victim
has widened considerably, and the effect assumes a punitive as well as a
reformative cast, although the severity of the attack is mitigated by the
absence or distance of a palpable vice. We are dealing here not so much
or not so directly with present vices as with missing virtues, although of
course the former is often implicit in the latter or hovering in the none too
distant background. Whether the speaker is the satirist or a character in
the work, he shares certain basic values with the audience and,
presumably, with the society at large. There is no real question about
what strengths and virtues, weaknesses and vices, are, only about how to
identify their practice and practitioners. When the speaker is the satirist
or a deliberate ironist like the Baron, he shares our sense of both. He
knows that beauty and speaking well are desirable qualities, and he knows
ugliness when he sees it, stammering inarticulateness when he hears it.
When the speaker is not a conscious ironist but a target of the satire,
he still has the decency and integrity to praise "Valour" and "Fidelity,"
"Love of ... Country," "profound Learning," "Wit," and philosophical
elegance and profundity. He is simply misinformed, foolish, or naive.
Although the Nominal Christian may be an exception here, the speaker's
failing is typically intellectual rather than moral, even in his case n10re of
obtuseness than malignancy. He is not yet a miscreant or villain, merely
something of a naif or fool with a relatively proper sense of virtue and vice
as abstractions or concepts, but a grievously defective capacity to distinguish them in practice.

3. Praise of present undesirable qualities or vices as though they are
virtues. This is another of the forms of blame-by-praise most readily
distinguished and most frequently remarked. Together with praise for absent virtues (#2), it constitutes what is often regarded as the full range of
blame-by-praise irony. 8 Examples in the literature are easy to find. One
of the most familiar is Gulliver's famous paean upon gunpowder to the
astonished King of Brobdingnag. Hoping to ingratiate himself with the
looming monarch, Gulliver grows descriptively ebullient as he offers to
assist him in the production of an invention that "would not only Destroy
whole Ranks of an Army at once; but batter the strongest Walls to the
Ground; sink down Ships with a thousand Men in each, to the Bottom of
the Sea
divide Hundreds of Bodies in the Middle, and lay all Waste
before [it]
" (II, Chap. 7). Swift's attack on Wolston in "Verses on
the Death of Dr. Swift" is another case in point. Swift's own poetry,
satire, and sermons have been long forgotten, he indicates. Different taste
8. This category is usually defined to include my own seventh type, which I have separated for reasons
explained below.
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rules the town, and the bookseller Lintot, commending Wolston's tracts
to the hypothetical buyer, lauds the free-thinking cleric as one who
. . . doth the Honour to his Gown,
By bravely running Priest-craft down:
He shews as sure as God's in Glouc'ster,
That Jesus was a Grand Imposter:
That all his Miracles were Cheats,
Perform'd as Juglers do their Feats:
The Church had never such a Writer:
A Shame, he hath not got a Mitre! (291-98)

One further example should suffice. Although Cacambo is but a
character in Voltaire's Candide, he clearly speaks for its author when,
with irony strong as Swift's, he praises "The reverend fathers [who] own
the whole lot and the people nothing." That, he adds cynically, is "what
I call a masterpiece of reason and justice. I don't think I have ever seen
such godlike creatures as the reverend fathers" (Chap. 14).
The distance between the satirist and his target is wider here than in
either of the first two classes of blame-by-praise. There are no genuine
virtues here, and we have moved beyond mere commendation for absent
virtues to celebration of present vices. The wanted virtues lauded in the
preceding type are at times mentioned prior to or following the ironic
praise, at times merely implied by its blatant insincerity or implausibility.
Here the vices assume center stage; they are rolled out and paraded before
us in the act of paying them tribute. When the speaker is a persona,
Gulliver for example, he is guilty of a greater transgression than in the
praise of absent virtues and is therefore set at a further remove from the
satirist. The Gulliver who praises the "Valour, Conduct and Fidelity" of
the Peers or the "great Abilities" and patriotism of the members of the
House of Commons simply does not know what he is talking about. He
is the ignorant patriot peddling the propaganda he has purchased unexamined. The Gulliver who praises the virtues and benefits of gunpowder knows very well what he extolls; its capacity for massive devastation is precisely what excites him and what he commends to the King.
This Gulliver, the kind of speaker (Lintot is another example) who directly and sincerely praises such wickedness, is no longer a mere ingenue
or fool; his sin is not informational but moral.
The satirist who employs this form of blame-by-praise, either in his
own person or through a targeted persona, still assumes a foundation of
shared values with his audience. There is agreement between them on the
nature of vice and virtue, and the reader is expected quickly to discern
deviations from the latter and exemplifications of the former when the
satirist displays them. But often, and I think in each of these three illustrations, there is the beginning of a falling away. There is, perhaps in the very
blatancy of the laudation of wickedness and perversity, a suggestion that
the speaker candidly articulates what are in fact the suppressed assump-
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tions or value of a significant portion of his audience and society. What
Gulliver praises, almost all of us have praised or admired, if with an inhibiting layer of civilized reluctance and restraint. What Cacambo calls
reason and justice is not substantially different from what too many of
Voltaire's readers had acclaimed with such accolades, though they may
have chosen other examples and obscured the facts of the case with more
hypocritical efficiency.

4. Praise for qualities that are desirable but that are trivial or contextually irrelevant. This is the third form of blame-by-praise mentioned by
Muecke. It is what he calls, more economically, "Inappropriate or irrelevant praise." His own example is Chaucer's praise of the Prioress's table
manners, a virtue quite irrelevant to her ecclesiastical calling and one
that points by its exclusivity to the absence of more important religious
values. Comparable, if somewhat more bitter examples can be found
in eighteenth-century satire. In Candide, for instance, Voltaire remarks
wryly that "Those who have never seen two well-trained armies drawn up
for battle, can have no idea of the beauty and brilliance of the display"
(Chap. 3). When he follows this aesthetic appreciation with the observation that "The opening barrage destroyed about six-thousand men on
each side," the deflective triviality of the earlier remark, if it was not
already clear, becomes manifest. Swift's "Argument Against Abolishing
Christianity" contains several examples of this kind of blame-by-praise
irony; they are a principal vehicle of its point and satire. One of the
Nominal Christian's arguments for maintaining Christianity in some innocuous form is that "Notions about a superior Power [are] . . . of
singular Use for the common People, as furnishing excellent Materials to
keep Children quiet when they grow peevish, and providing Topicks for
Amusement in a tedious Winter Night." The object of the speaker's commendation here is so petty and remote from the religious point that one
might ignore or overlook the positive remnant. If one perceives pacification and amusement as abuses of religion or scripture, this no longer
qualifies as praise for a genuinely desirable quality at all. But if one accepts them as legitimate if absurdly inconsequential benefits of Christianity, the speaker's recommendation does bestow praise on a trivial benefit
as a means of pointedly turning away from what Swift clearly regards as
the more essential blessings of religious belief. A less debatable example
from the "Argument" is the Nominal Christian's tentative reflection that
"in certain Tracts of Country, like what we call Parishes, there should be
one Man at least, of Abilities to read and write," namely the preacher who
would otherwise be abolished with his religion. Here, as he often does,
Swift penetrates a second target (illiteracy) on his way to the main one.
And the efficacy of his secondary assault is contingent on the sincerity of
his claim. There should indeed be at least one literate man in every parish.
And while that is by no means a persuasive religious argument for the
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preservation of Christianity, it is an observation that cannot be sweepingly dismissed.
With this class of blame-by-praise, as in the first type, we are dealing
with praise of what are in fact desirable or appreciable qualities or effects,
though the irony here is a good deal sharper and less accepting. The virtues themselves are generally less impressive than those attributed to
Belinda and Atticus. And even where they are not, they are chiefly
pointers rather than primary objects of attention. Belinda's beauty may
be overshadowed by her vanity, Atticus's talents by his cowardice and
pride; but in both instances their virtues are objects of separable and
respectful attention. In this present category, phenomena that are
predominantly deplorable (armies drawn up for battle, Nominal Christianity) are praised for genuine but tangential merits, principally in order
to focus attention on their profounder defects or infamies. The gulf between the satirist and the immediate target is wider here than in the first
type, varying in relation to the second and third. In a formal sense it is
narrower than in the praise of absent virtues or present vices, since here
some virtues, however minor or irrelevant, are acknowledged. The question of felt distance, however, will vary from case to case; the formal distinction will, I think, prove less influential in determining distance than
the severity of the charge itself.
Where the speaker is a persona and himself a target (as I believe he
usually is in the "Argument"), he is attacked not so much for a moral failing, as Gulliver is in his praise of gunpowder, but for moral obtuseness,
his inability to see or respond to the greater moral force of the iniquity he
has overlooked in his attention to the trivial attraction. In this sense, the
persona or speaker-as-target stands midway between simple ignorance
(Gulliver lauding the virtues of members of Parliament) and blatant
moral callousness (Gulliver orgastic over the annihilating potency of gunpowder). Given the moral difference between ignoring wickedness in the
celebration of irrelevant beauties and celebrating the wickedness itself,
praise of present vices signals a wider gap between satirist and immediate
target than does praise of irrelevant virtues.
I have placed this form of blame-by-praise further along the spectrum
of severity because a substantial gulf has opened between the satirist and
his audience or the society at large. The implication of irony of this type,
as in these two illustrations and typically, is that there is something in the
reader and in his society that renders him susceptible to this sort of
frivolous or irrelevant appeal. The assumption is that he is sufficiently obtuse, his moral sensibilities sufficiently blunted, to be appealed to in this
way, to be at least temporarily deflected from the deeper iniquities by the
superficial attractions dangled before him. Since the audience, I believe,
becomes in this kind of irony the satirist's principal target, this seems to
me a harsher kind of irony than any discussed this far. Although it
acknowledges virtues as well as vices in its immediate target, its implica-
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tions for the moral condition of the satirist's world at large are graver.

5. Praise of limited vices for not being worse. This form of irony is
relatively infrequent, but it can be used to excellent effect. Candide's
grateful rhapsody on the restraint of the Oreillons is an instance of the
type. The cannibalistic Oreillons, preparing to skewer and consume Candide as a Jesuit, release him when they learn he is none and win his exuberant praise. "'What grand people they are!' he said. 'What fine
fellows! And what culture! ... When all is said and done, there is a sterling goodness in unsophisticated Nature; for instead of eating me, these
people behaved most politely as soon as they learnt that I was not a
Jesuit' "(Chap. 16). Gulliver offers a more subdued and modest version
of this kind of irony in a variation on what is generally referred to as the
"ironic defense." But there is a critical difference between this and ironic
defense. Whereas the latter is an absurd defense of the indefensible -like
the Hack's Modest Defense of the Proceedings of the Rabble in All Ages
in A Tale of the Tub - Gulliver's, like Candide's, is a pathetic defense of
what should require none. In response to the Houyhnhnm Master's accusation that Yahoos seem to exhibit a singular disposition to nastiness
and dirt, Gulliver declares confidently that
I could have easily vindicated human Kind from the Imputation of Singularity upon the last
Article, if there had been any Swine in that Country, (as unluckily for me there were not)
which although it may be a sweeter Quadruped than a Yahoo, cannot I humbly conceive in
Justice pretend to more Cleanliness; and so his Honour himself must have owned, if he had
seen their filthy way of feeding, and their Custom of wallowing and sleeping in the Mud. (IV,
Chap. 7)

In these examples and in this kind of blame-by-praise irony, the speaker
praises or defends the satiric target for an attribute that, in less degenerate
times or circumstances, would not warrant either defense or praise. Candide rhapsodizes on the "sterling goodness" of the Oreillons as manifest
in their having refrained from devouring him when they learned he was
not a Jesuit. By doing so, he praises them not for a virtue certainly, not
even for a demonstrated vice, but for the absence of unqualified depravity. Candide's tribute is extended to a race that does not behave as cruelly
or as indiscriminately as it might; ecstatic praise is offered for a mere
restriction or limitation of vice. Gulliver offers another example of the
type. His defense of the Yahoo derives from its maintaining a level of
cleanliness superior to that of the swine. His remarks point to the actual
filthiness of man as the second dirtiest animal as well as toward the still
deeper pit we so gratifyingly avoid.
The speaker and subject are not of critical importance here. The
speaker is not the author in either of my examples, but he is more an instrument than a target of the satire. His childlike naivete allows him to express sincerely or enthusiastically what the satirist would remark more
cynically. The effective difference between this and the kinds of satire we

Published by Digital Commons @ Colby, 1986

9

Colby Quarterly, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 3

WILLIAM FREEDMAN

147

have discussed previously is that (even n10re than the fourth) it relies on
a presumption of advanced degeneration. Whether the immediate target
is the society or human nature at large or - as in neither of these
examples - a single individual, the gap between satirist and target is wider
here than in the praise of present vices, real, absent or irrelevant virtues.
For the ultimate target is the condition from which expectations arise. A
new cynicism is introduced here, indicative of a state of turpitude so deepseated and so widespread that any sign that we are less than utterly fetid
or wicked is cause for celebration.

6. Ironic praise of named virtues set to corrupt or perverse ends. A
good deal more blame-by-praise than we have realized occurs in the praising not of absent virtues or present vices, but, as we have seen in the first
and fourth categories, in the ironic commendation of real or partially real
virtues. Belinda's beauty is also a named virtue pressed into' corrupting
service, but an important transformation has taken place here: the
distinction between vice and virtue itself and of the language appropriate
to each, has become blurred. A few illustrations should introduce the
distinction my discussion will attempt to clarify.
The Beggar's Opera makes extensive use of this kind of blame-bypraise. When Peachum expresses contempt for laziness and praises the
"Industry" that has added to his stock (I, iii); and when he offers to soften
the evidence against a whore because she is "very active and industrious"
(I, ii), he is speaking of the activity and industriousness of prostitutes and
thieves, the energy and diligence they bring to their sordid trades. When
Mrs. Peachum exhorts a wilting pickpocket to "learn Valour" (I, vi), it is
of course courage in the performance of his thievery she commends him
to. Pope's ironic praise of the "four guardian Virtues" who attend the
throne of Dullness in Book One of The Dunciad bears a close family
resemblance to the Peachums' praise of industry and valor:
In clouded Majesty here Dulness shone;
Four guardian Virtues, round, support her throne:
Fierce champion Fortitude, that knows no fears
Of hisses, blows, or want, or loss of ears:
Calm Temperance, whose blessings those partake
Who hunger, and who thirst for scribbling sake:
Prudence, whose glass presents th' approaching jail:
Poetic Justice, with her lifted scale,
Where in nice balance, truth with gold she weighs,
And solid pudding against empty praise. (I, 45-54)

In a sense, four of the types discussed thus far come together here. The
virtues praised in these examples are real virtues (#1, #4): hard work,
courage, fortitude, temperance, and so forth. Since their abusive subornation is the focus of attention, the real virtue whose name and defining
traits they continue to bear, Le., the same virtue properly and laudably
applied, is made conspicuous by its absence, and the target is praised at
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once for a virtue he possesses and for one he manifestly lacks (#2). What
he is in fact praised for is the employment of a potentially desirable quality in the service of an overriding vice: thievery, prostitution, and dullness. He is commended, in other words, for the more efficient performance of present vices (#3); and in the light of this, the virtue for which
he is commended is trivialized (#4).
The satirist stands in roughly the same relation to the immediate object
of his derision as he does in #2, #3, and #4, but his assumptions about the
values of the audience and society have taken an even darker turn. An
underlying assumption of this sort of blame-by-praise, I believe, is that
the society to which the satirist and his audience belong has lost its will or
capacity to distinguish the proper practice of virtues from their gross
abuse. In the words of The Dunciad and The Beggar's Opera, dullness and
corruption have become so all-encompassing that they have invaded the
language and swallowed whatever strengths or merits we still possess.
Language in such a world serves to disguise the malevolent purposes to
which human abilities are turned, and those abilities themselves have been
subsumed by the swarming miasma, adding to its mass. No serious
damage is done to the ternl or conception of beauty when Belinda's is used
in the service of vanity and adored beyond its worth. Both the terms and
our notions of valor, industry, temperance, and prudence suffer substantial erosion when they are praised for their contributions to vice and
dullness. In such a world, the very distinction between virtue and vicenot only the capacity of some to make that distinction - is dangerously in
question.

7. Praise of vices that bear the names of virtues. This is an aspect or
variant of #3, the praise of present vices, and is typically included in that
category. But there is an important difference between the two. Here the
vice is not only praised as though it were a virtue, it has absorbed the name
of that virtue. This linguistic pollution represents a significant advance in
the satirist's sense of the corruption of his target and society and consequently a substantial widening of the gulf between them. The Beggar's
Opera derives much of its comedy and more of its satiric bite from its
employment of this strategy. When Mrs. Peachum expresses fear for the
"Honour of our Family" (I, vii) if Polly has married Macheath, it is the
"honour" attendant on mercenary exploitation and lost with love and
marriage that she speaks of. "Honour" keeps its name, but its source is no
longer honesty or integrity of character, but the willingness and capacity
shrewdly to exploit others to one's own advantage. When she laments the
futility of the "Lectures of Morality" wasted on handsome daughters (I,
viii), "morality" has become a synonym for predatory self-aggrandizement. And when she predicts, exultingly, that if Filch's life is not ended
on a rope, he will be "a great Man in History" (I, vi), it is clear that our
notions of greatness have undergone jarring revision. Although neither
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Mrs. Peachum nor The Beggar's Opera verbally define "great Man," the
ingredients are not far to seek. They are found in Jonathan Wild, where
Fielding defines (or redefines) the term narrowly and explicitly. Much of
the satire of this book, in fact, turns on this cynical redefinition. A
"GREAT MAN," as the narrator defines him and as the novel displays
him, is "one of those who employ hands merely for their own use, without
regard to the benefit of society" (I, Chap. 14). "The truest mark of
GREATNESS is insatiability" (II, Chap. 1).
In this class of blame-by-praise irony, linguistic and moral corruption
have proceeded at least one stage beyond that indicated by the preceding
category. There virtues turned to vicious ends kept the names of virtues,
but in part at least deservedly, since the qualities they described, whatever
purposes they were put to, remain those associated with that virtue. "Industry" in the practice of thievery is dubious industry to be sure, but it retains its denotation as "assiduous effort or activity." "Valour" in the performance of this same criminality is valor perverted and abused, but it
remains denotatively synonymous with the admittedly admirable qualities
of courage, boldness, and intrepidity. In the present class of ironic praise,
we have progressed beyond the illicit subornation of otherwise positive attributes to the wholesale redefinition of vices as virtues. The activities or
traits con1mended here maintain the names of virtues and thereby absorb
their positive connotations. But they no longer exhibit any significant
denotative similarity to the qualities whose names they have expropriated.
Quite the contrary, they employ the attractive connotative screen to conceal the denotative inversion that has occurred or, where the redefinition
is explicit, to make vice more saleable by wrapping it in virtue's name.
As in each of the three preceding categories, the real target of such
ironic praise is rarely if ever an individual, typically (perhaps always) the
society at large. Since language is never a private but always a public instrument, a corruption of language - surely one of this shrillness and
magnitude - signals a corruption in the public sector. A contamination of
moral language - a confusion of vices and virtues and the application of
the name of one to instances of the other - is a mark of deep corrosion in
the value system of the society under attack. The implication of such
linguistic pollution is that the principal difference between the literary
world of the satire and the physical world it satirizes is that the former
uses language honestly. This, implies the satirist, is what we really mean
by and honor as "greatness"; this is the "morality" we teach and respect.
In such a world, the distinction between vice and virtue is not merely
threatened or blurred. Vice has become virtue, virtue vice or at least
foolishness. We are on the brink of total degeneracy here; a short step will
take us over.

8. Praise of vices that bear the names of vices. This is another branch
of the praise of present vices class of blame-by-praise and another that is
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more profitably distinguished from the simplest and commonest exemplifications of the type. This category, the last we will introduce, offers
not merely praise of what we all recognize as vices, not praise of vices
bearing the names of virtues, but vices brazenly parading in their own
familiar appellations and celebrated with matching boldness. Fielding offers us a simple example in Jonathan Wild. "This young lady," writes the
narrator of the whore Laetitia Snap, "among many other good ingredients, had three very predominant passions, to wit, vanity, wantonness,
and avarice" (II, Chap. 3). In "MacFlecknoe," Peri Bathous, and The
Dunciad, Dryden and Pope elaborate the technique into the central
strategy of the satire. The point of Peri Bathous, of course, is to recommend and teach the "Art of Sinking in Poetry," the "Art of the Bathos,
or Profound." In the service of this lofty pedagogical objective, Pope
ironically commends to would-be practitioners of the art a wide variety of
"laudable" techniques and goals, all of which shamelessly bear the names
that mark them: to "arrive at images . . . wonderfully low and
unaccountable"; to "preserve a laudable prolixity"; to copy "the Imperfections and Blemishes of celebrated authors"; to "study . . . the Abuse of
Speech"; and to practice and perfect the arts of "The Vulgar," "The Infantine," "The Inanity, or Nothingness," and so on into the bathetic night
(Chapters 6, 8, 9, 10, 11).
Dryden employs a mocked speaker, Flecknoe, to purvey his praise of
named defects and abuses. It is Flecknoe in all earnest rather than Dryden
in all sarcasm who glorifies Shadwell as one "Mature in dullness from his
tender years . . . Who stands confirm'd in full stupidity. . . . [The] last
great Prophet of Tautology" (15-18, 30). In The Dunciad, Pope both
speaks ironically in his own person and employs targeted speakers as he
spreads the Empire of Dullness over all of Western Civilization. In Book
One, Cibber offers a paean to the great Queen as "First in my care, and
ever at my heart; / Dullness! whose good old cause I yet defend / With
whom my Muse began, with whom shall end" (I, 164-66). In Book Three,
Settle heralds Cibber as one in whom "All nonsense this, of old or modern
date, / Shall . . . centre, from thee circulate" (III, 59-60). And in the
final lines of the fourth and last book, Pope, hovering delicately between
blunt despair and ironic contempt, cries out:
Lo! thy dread Empire CHAOS! is restored;
Light dies before thy uncreating word:
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fall;
And universal Darkness buries All. (IV, 653-56)

This is praise of vice or darkness but with a vengeful difference. It is one
thing, and bleak enough, to mistake ignorance for wisdom, villainy for
virtue and to commend them accordingly. This is what Gulliver does when
he praises the destructive power of gunpowder and sees its human cost
only in the light of the presumed good of extending hegenl0ny over an un-
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willing adversary. It is a far more ominous thing to recognize villainy,
stupidity, or evil for precisely what they are and to praise them in their
name - as though Gulliver were to praise not gunpowder and its prodigious capabilities, but "mass murder" per se. It is the difference between
the inability to recognize wickedness or stupidity for what they truly are
and their willful acclamation for precisely that identity. We have come a
long way beyond the traditional praise of undesirable qualities here. But
it is difficult to know exactly where on our spectrum of ironies to situate
this category. Since language remains untainted, there is less hypocrisy
here than in the preceding type-indeed, there is a stunning honesty here.
For the same reason, the intactness of axiological language, we are less
certain of the cultural pervasiveness of the disease. It seems to vary from
work to work or case to case. In "MacFlecknoe," the "Realms of
Nonsense" have their royal seat in Pissing Alley, extend from "near
Bunhill ... [to] distant Watling Street" (97 -no very great distance), and
have aspirations of empire "from Ireland . . . / To far Barbadoes . . .
(139-40-no very populous region). The assumption that almost by
definition attends instruction in the "Art of Sinking" is that a vast audience of amateurs awaits this professionalization of their trade - a point
Pope makes explicit in the first chapter of Peri Bathous. And in The Dunciad, of course, the Dullness praised by a train of celebrants and disciples
is the "great Anarch" who, having conquered the entire western world, "in
universal Darkness buries All." The range is quite wide, then, but in all
but the narrowest imaginable cases (where the speaker is a manifest
anomaly), there are grave implications for society at large. For although
language itself has not been abused or mutated here, is not used perversely
or deceptively, pejoratives have assumed the role of terms of approbation. The willingness, even of dullards, publicly and shamelessly to make
honorifics of terms like Nonsense, Dullness, Bathos, and Inanity points
to a general dulling of the public sensibility, to a substantial audience of
responsive compatriots, or both.
At all events, there is a very wide gap between the satirist and his target
in this kind of ironic praise. Where the target is the Dullard who, like
Flecknoe or Cibber, is obtuse enough to celebrate Nonsense or Dullness
with the unhesitating use of their own names, we are dealing with the final
stages of either intellectual or moral degradation. If the speaker does not
share his audience's values, there can be no richer indication of his own
imbecility than his eagerness to laud the vice in its undisguised form. If he
does, they are mutual participants in a society whose contempt for traditional values and affinity for stupidity or wickedness can go no further.
When the satirist speaks ironically in his own voice, he separates himself
from such a society, but assumes the degradation as he speaks. In this
world, vice has cast aside the homage to virtue hypocrisy implies. There
is no need for a corruption of language in a universe dark as this, for the
utter invisibility of virtue makes even lip service superfluous. Where the
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decay of morals, intelligence, and decency is complete, stupidity and evil
can announce themselves unashamed.
My classification of ironic blame-by-praise undoubtedly has its difficulties and limitations. Some may perceive the distinctions as excessively
finicky. Others may be able to supply subcategories I have overlooked; on
this great chain of ironies it is always theoretically and often empirically
possible to insert additional species between the extant links. Some may
wish to alter the hierarchy. But whatever the imperfections of the present
schema, I hope it indicates that the house of ironic blame-by-praise has
many more rooms than we had thought and that its residents have much
to tell us about the relationship between satirist and target and about the
satirist's view of the world that creates, oppresses, and contains them.
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